Friendly Fire:

Electoral Discrimination and Ethnic Minority Candidates

RANDY BESCO
University of Toronto

It has been widely demonstrated that racialized candidates face discrimination, and a common presumption is that they suffer electorally as a result. Yet, many studies show mixed or null findings. The proposed explanation is that discrimination disproportionately affects racialized candidates for parties of the right, while racialized candidates of the left are insulated from discrimination. This is because voters with anti-minority attitudes tend to be concentrated on the right, and counter-stereotypical attributes have stronger effects. The study uses two methods, a candidate experiment, and a difference-in-difference approach using candidate demographic data merged with aggregate election results, and demonstrates that only racialized candidates of right-wing parties suffer from electoral discrimination. These effects appear to be the result of negative attitudes toward racial minorities, not perceptions of ideological position.

Introduction

Despite the continuing influence of racism in society and public opinion, there is less evidence of electoral discrimination against ethnic minority candidates than might be expected. While there are numerous studies linking discriminatory attitudes and candidates, many studies examining real elections and whether ethnic minority candidates do worse than white candidate produce mixed or null findings. One reason for this is that negative attitudes toward-minorities are concentrated on the right, while minority candidates tend to run for parties on the left, and therefore little electoral discrimination actually occurs. However, so far this has only been tested in situations where there are few, if any, minority candidates on the right (e.g. Street 2014, Voss and Lublin 2001). This study examines an alternative situation: when minority candidates run for parties on both the left and the right. In this case, electoral discrimination will be concentrated on minority candidates on the right, while those on the left will be insulated.

The incorporation of ethnic diversity issues into the left-right spectrum means that right-wing party supporters are more likely to discriminate. That is, voters with negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups are more likely to support right-wing parties. Crucially, it is argued, some right-wing voters will defect or at least stay home rather than support an ethnic minority candidate, but left-wing voters will be less willing to cross party lines to support an ethnic minority candidate. The result is that ethnic minority candidates for right-wing parties bear the brunt of discrimination at the ballot box, since their own party supporters desert them, but they do not gain support from left-leaning voters with more positive attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Conversely, ethnic minority candidates of left-wing parties are shielded from the effects of discrimination.

This study draws on both experimental and aggregate election data from Canada. This is an excellent case to test the theory since attitudes towards ethnic minorities differ by party, but a

substantial number of ethnic minority candidates run for all parties. The experimental test includes manipulations of candidate ethnic minority status and party affiliation, demonstrating that the causal effect of candidate ethnic minority status holds only for the right-wing Conservative Party, and is driven by desertion by Conservative Party supporters. The aggregate election data test uses a difference-in-difference design, linking candidate demographic data to real election data in four federal elections. Using both experimental and aggregate data provides a substantial advantage in establishing both the causal mechanism and the external validity. The results confirm that ethnic minority Conservative party candidates receive fewer votes than White candidates, while ethnic minority candidates of other parties suffer no such penalty.

Two mechanisms for this are explored with the experimental data: negative attitudes toward minorities and ideological counter-stereotyping. First, minority candidates on the right might receive less support due to straightforward negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities. These voters might hold various negative stereotypes about ethnic minorities, and are less likely to support ethnic minority candidates. Alternatively, ethnic minority candidates on the right might be ideologically counter-stereotypical. That is, ethnic minorities are stereotyped as left-leaning, and less conservative. As a result, right-leaning voters would be less likely to support them. Using a measure of attitudes toward ethnic minorities, the results show that respondents with negative attitudes toward minorities are less likely to support the minority candidate. Conversely, there is no difference in the perceived ideological position of White and ethnic minority candidates. This evidence suggests that negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities, rather than ideological stereotyping, is the cause of the electoral discrimination found here.

These results support the theory that electoral discrimination is often “friendly fire” – inflicted on ethnic minority candidate of right-wing parties by their own party supporters.

Notably, this is the first evidence of electoral discrimination against ethnic minority candidates in Canada. The root cause of this seems to be negative attitudes about minorities, rather than ideological stereotypes about (left-leaning) minorities.

Ethnic Minority Candidates and Electoral Discrimination

Given widespread evidence of negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups in countries around the world, it is often assumed that ethnic minority candidates must suffer electoral discrimination - that they receive fewer votes, and are therefore less likely to win elections than a White candidate. The bulk of this research focuses on African-American candidates, such as experimental studies showing that White voters[1] are more likely to evaluate African-American candidates more negatively (Moskowitz and Stroh 1994), and to support White candidates rather than African-American candidates (Terkildsen 1993). Similarly, the election of Barak Obama led to multiple studies linking racial attitudes to attitudes toward Obama and his policies (e.g. Greenwald et al. 2009, Berinsky et al. 2011).

On the other hand, Obama's victory - and notably, it was a victory and not a loss despite his ethnic minority status - was a historic election for a chief executive office, and so it is less clear if these findings are generalizable to lower profile candidates, or subsequent, less historical candidacies. Moreover, there are multiple studies which find mixed or null effects in real elections. Citrin et al. (1990), for example, found no effect of race on support for a Black candidate for governor. Other studies like Bullock and Dunn (1999) and Voss and Lublin (2001), which use aggregate data and ecological inference, find little evidence of White backlash against Black candidates. To be sure, they do not argue that prejudice does not exist, but rather, as Voss

[1]In most of the research discussed here the majority group is White voters, though the relevant analytical category is really the ethnic majority group. While it is possible that there is discrimination between ethnic minorities groups this seems to not always be the case (see Author, date) so I set aside that issue here.

and Lublin (2001, p. 173) put it, “southern Whites avoid most Democrats”, referring to the Republican domination of the South. The subtext is that almost all Black candidates are Democratic, so race adds nothing more to the equation. Similarly, Highton (2004), using exit poll data linked to congressional candidate demographic data, shows that voters are no less likely to support Black candidates, though he argues this is due to the fact that those likely to discriminate are the least likely to know a candidate’s race.

Results for other ethnic groups and in other countries are similarly mixed. For example, Abosch et al. (2007) conclude that these is clear evidence of block voting against Latino candidates in California, but Abrajano and Alvarez 2005 argue this is primarily the result of ideological perceptions, and in fact White voters do support some Latino candidates. Zingher and Farrar (2014) find no evidence White voters are less likely to support ethnic minority candidates in Australia, but do find discrimination in the UK. While Fisher et al. (2014) report that British voters discriminate against Muslim candidates, they find no evidence of discrimination against other Black or Asian candidates. Street (2014) found no evidence that ethnic minority candidates receive fewer votes in Germany, and Black and Erickson 2006 reports similar null findings in Canada.

In sum, there is certainly some evidence that ethnic minority candidates suffer from electoral discrimination, but other studies that come to the opposite conclusion or argue that findings of discrimination have been overstated. Why do studies of racial attitudes find clear evidence of racism in studies of attitudes, but much less so in the study of electoral results? The structure of voter attitudes by party plays an important role.

Ethnic Minority Candidates and Party Affiliation

Parties and coalitions of supporters around the world are, to a large degree, organized along a left-right axis, and negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups, immigration,

multiculturalism, and related issues are almost always positioned on the right. The result is that party affiliation powerfully conditions the effect of discriminatory attitudes on ethnic minority candidates. Specifically, effects are concentrated on ethnic minority candidates on the right, while ethnic minority candidates on the left are insulated.

There is a great deal of evidence that right-wing voters tend to have more negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups, while those who support parties on the left, relatively speaking, have more positive attitudes toward ethnic minorities (e.g. Archer and Ellis 1994, Carmines and Layman 1998; Greenwald et al. 2009; Saggar 1998).The degree to which parties are polarized on ethnic minority issues no doubt varies across countries, but the positions of the left and right are quite standardized, perhaps due to the influence of psychological factors like openness as a personality type linking many similar issues (Gerber et al. 2010). The point here is that the polarization on racial issues explored here functions similarly in the party systems of many countries, in that the left holds more positive perspectives towards minorities than the right. To be clear, certainly not all supporters of right-wing parties, or even a majority of them, have negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups, but they are proportionally more so than those of left-wing parties.

What happens when right-wing parties nominate ethnic minority candidates? Street provides perhaps the clearest account, arguing that "the fact that discriminatory voters are found mainly on the Right, and minority candidates on the Left, limits the direct effects of discrimination" (2014 p. 373). Given the concentration of negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups in parties of the right, nominating an ethnic minority candidate will be perceived negatively by a sizeable number of party supporters. Yet, because voters with negative attitudes toward minorities are concentrated on the right and ethnic minority candidates on the left, voters

with negative attitudes toward minorities generally support the right-wing parties, but ethnic minority candidates primarily run for left-wing parties, the ethnic minority candidates do not receive fewer votes than a White candidate would - no actual electoral discrimination occurs. (Voss and Lublin 2001, Bullock and Dunn 1999, Street 2014).

This dynamic may be responsible for the null findings discussed above. If, for example, only a small number of ethnic minority candidates of right-wing parties lose votes, the small sample size may still produce a null finding. Similarly, the small effect size for discrimination for left-wing parties might produce the same effect. This also might explains why the overall level of discrimination is often low: if supporters of parties of the right dislike ethnic minorities, it would hardly be surprising if ethnic minority candidates were less likely to be nominated by those parties, or even to want to run for them.

If ethnic minority candidates lose right-wing voters will they attract voters with positive attitudes toward ethnic minorities? Or alternatively, will they gain left-wing voters who are attracted by the stereotype of ethnic minority candidates as left-leaning? While possible, there are several reasons that this effect is probably weaker and less likely. In part, this is because voters probably know more about the candidates of the party they are supporting than about candidates of other parties. More generally, reactions to negative stimuli are stronger than to positive stimuli, which has been demonstrated across a wide range of political contexts (Soroka 2014). Finally, voters are more likely to reject messages or appeals from an opposing party, thus persuasion across party lines is quite difficult (Nelson and Garst 2005). This makes it difficult for ethnic minority candidates on the right to replace the support they lose from within their own party by appealing to pro-diversity supporters on the left.

One objection might be that while nearly all anti-immigrant parties are on the right, not all right-wing parties are anti-immigrant. Some conservative parties (23%, according to Cochren 2 013[2]) are actually left of center regarding immigration. It may be that the dynamics discussed here do not apply to these parties. On the other hand, most of these parties are quite small, generally receiving around 5% of the vote. For example, this includes Denmark's Christian People's Party, Finland's Christian Democrats, the Netherlands' Christian Union, Italy's Unione di Centro, and Switzerland's Evangelical People's Party. While, this group of socially conservative pro-immigrant parties includes the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party, this data was coded during a period when the right had split into two parties, and the Progressive Conservative faction was by far the smaller faction. As we shall see, following the reuniting of the right, the successor party (the Conservative Party of Canada) illustrates precisely the kind of discrimination against racialized candidates at issue. While there may be a subtype of right-wing party which shows no discrimination, most large and mainstream right-wing parties should show the tendencies described here.

So far, the motivation for discrimination has been described as party supporters having negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities, with the straightforward mechanism that they dislike ethnic minority candidates or hold negative stereotypes about them. However, an alternative explanation might be ideological counter-stereotyping. Some research suggests that ethnic minorities are stereotyped as being left-leaning (Seligman et al. 1995, Jones 2013, McDermott 1998). Presumably, right-wing voters would not like a left-leaning candidate, and so would be less likely to support ethnic minority candidates. Notably, Street (2014) find that right-wing voters who are threatened by minorities are more likely to think a minority candidate is running for a left-wing party, and therefore not support them. The ideological stereotyping explanation

[2]See especially Figure 3. The party data were coded by Benoit and Laver 2006 using the results of the 2000 election.

would produce essentially the same results as negative attitudes toward minorities, but with a different mechanism.

In sum, party coalitions and the structure of public opinion – that supporters of right-wing parties are more likely to have negative attitudes toward ethnic minority groups than supporters of left-wing parties – condition the effect of discrimination on ethnic minority candidates. Where there are few or no ethnic minority candidates for right-wing parties, the result will be a small or null finding of electoral effects of discrimination. Where ethnic minority candidates do run for right-wing parties, the result will be that the electoral effects of discrimination are concentrated against ethnic minority candidates of right-wing parties, since their own supporters abandon them. Conversely, ethnic minority candidates of left-wing parties will be insulated from discrimination, because many of those who would discriminate against them were already voting against them because of their party affiliation.

However, research to date has tested only one part of this theory: when voters with negative attitudes toward minorities are concentrated on the right but minority candidates run for parties of the left, thus leading to no electoral discrimination (Voss and Lublin 2001, Street 2014). The following analysis aims to test the alternative situation: when minority candidates *do* run for parties of the right. The expectation is that White voters will be less likely to support minority candidates than White candidates, but this effect will be larger for candidates of right-wing parties than left-wing parties. This effect might be caused by two mechanisms: negative attitudes toward minorities where those with more negative attitudes are less likely to support minority candidates, or ideological stereotyping, where right-leaning voters are less likely to support minority candidates because they are perceived as left-leaning.

The Canadian Case

The Canadian case makes a useful test of this theory in that it meets the required conditions, and should provide conservative estimates. Unlike in Germany (Street 2014) and the United States (Voss and Lublin 2001), the right-wing nominates many ethnic minority candidates. For example, in the 2011 election 12% of Conservative Party candidates were ethnic minorities, slightly more than the center-left Liberal Party and left-wing NDP.[3] Since party nominations are small affairs with only a few hundred local members voting, ethnic minority candidates can win by signing up supportive members of their own community. There are sometimes objections to this and calls to institute barriers, such as restricting nominations to longstanding members (KTW 2005; CBC 2008). However, party leaders have consistently declined to intervene, perhaps because they view nominating minority candidates as being beneficial in ethnically diverse areas, or as important to the national party's reputation (Sobolewska 2013). In any case, unlike in a primary system, ethnic minority candidates can be nominated even with a lack of enthusiasm among the broader party base.

Crucially, while there may be less polarization on ethnic minority issues then in some countries, there are still differences between party supporters on ethnic minority issues. As Table 1 illustrates, Conservative voters are clearly less likely than those of other parties to think that more should be done for racial minorities – for example, 15% fewer Conservative supporters than Liberal Party supporters think that more should be done. The size of this difference varies based on the measures, but the key point is there are differences in the attitudes toward ethnic minorities of supporters of different parties.

[3]Analysis by author, using data discussed below. For more detailed discussion see Black (2013, 2013), but note that Black excludes Latin American candidates.

Table 1: "How Much Should be Done for Racial Minorities" by Vote Choice

	More	Less
NDP	43%	11%
Liberal	36%	11%
Conservatives	21%	21%

Cell entries are percentage of total respondents. Combines "Much" and "Somewhat" responses. Other categories not shown. Data from the 2011 Canadian Election Study.

There are also three reasons to think that in Canada the effect of an ethnic minority candidate is small, relative to other countries which means ethnic minority candidates running from right-wing parties in other locations are likely to be even more negatively impacted than what is demonstrated here. First, local candidate effects in Canada are generally considered to be smaller than in other countries, often attributed to tight party discipline and strict campaign spending rules. For example, in terms of incentives to develop a personal vote Carey and Shugart(1995) rank Canada at the very bottom. Second, during the elections used in the analysis below (2004-2011), ethnic minority issues were not especially high-profile – compared to, for example, multiculturalism in the 1990's, and the niqab and refugee issues in the most recent 2015 election. Since discrimination is likely to be lower when ethnic minority issues are less salient, these estimates are likely to be conservative. Finally, on issues such as ethnic minorities, immigration, and multiculturalism, Canadians are more tolerant than most countries, although they are certainly not an outlier (Donnelly 2017).

The key structural factors - a difference between party supporters in attitudes toward ethnic minorities and the presence of ethnic minority candidates for the right-wing party - are both present in Canada. This makes it possible to test the theory described above. Moreover, the size of the effect is likely to be smaller in Canada than elsewhere, because candidate effects in

general are small, ethnic minority issues were not especially salient during the elections studied, and attitudes toward ethnic minority groups are less negative than in many countries. This makes Canada during this period of time a good place to test the theory.

Experimental Data

To test the relationship between discrimination against ethnic minority candidates and party affiliation, two methods are used: an experiment and a difference-in-difference analysis using aggregate election data. The experiment was part of a larger cooperative online survey conducted in English (details on other questions and treatments available from author), with no respondents from Quebec. The manipulations analyzed here applied to 296 White respondents, who are the focus of this analysis. While the demographics are for the most part similar to population data, as is usual with samples of this kind, respondents have a somewhat higher than average level of education. Given the expected negative correlation between education and discrimination, this suggests these estimates are conservative. The experiment presented respondents with short biographies of two candidates and asked which they would vote for. Using two candidates, rather than evaluations of a single candidate, is both a more realistic design, and less obtrusive - it allows respondents to express prejudice by voting for the White candidate without obviously rejecting or making a negative statement about the ethnic minority candidate. Photos were not used, to avoid confounds such as attractiveness, age, etc. Details of the candidate biographies are available in the appendix.

The factor structure is two by two, with treatments for candidate ethnicity and party affiliation. Candidate ethnic minority status was manipulated by stereotypically European names: John Hawkes (Candidate 1) and Arthur Dorre (Candidate 2), and a traditionally Chinese name

(Jun Zhang) or South Asian name (Satveer Chaudhary) name. Since there are no clear differences in effects (see appendix), in the analysis that follows the Chinese and South Asian conditions are merged into a single ethnic minority candidate treatment to maximize statistical power. Party affiliation is manipulated by a statement that the ethnic minority candidate is either a Liberal candidate or a Conservative candidate. These are the only parties that have won elections at the federal level. The other candidate is given the alternate party label, thus there are no Liberal/Liberal or Conservative/Conservative pairs. These manipulations allow testing of interactions between ethnic minority status and specific parties. Respondent party support (vote for the Conservative Party in the 2011 federal election) rather than partisan identification is used so that it matches the aggregate analysis which follows, and also because those with weak partisan ties are those most likely to be affected by local candidates (Roy and Alcantara 2015). In addition, using supporters rather than partisans increases the cell size and statistical power.

The expectation is that ethnic minority Conservative candidates suffer because their own party supporters desert them. To test this, the analysis in Model 1 uses logistic regression, where vote for Candidate 2 is the dependant variable, the independent variables are candidate ethnicity (White/minority) candidate party (Conservative/Liberal), respondent vote choice (Conservative/other) and a set of interaction terms.

The results of the experiment in Figure 1 illustrate that the candidate ethnicity treatment effect is negative, large, and statistically significant for Conservative party supporters who see the name of the ethnic minority Conservative Candidate 2 (predicted probabilities shown, detailed model results in appendix). The ethnic minority Conservative candidate receives 32 percentage points less support than the White Conservative candidate ($p=.02$). Conversely, the Liberal ethnic minority candidate does not suffer from electoral discrimination – in fact, none of

the other combinations show statistically significant effects. This demonstrates that it is Conservative supporters who defect - they are much less likely to support an ethnic minority Conservative candidate than a White Conservative candidate - but other voters (who may have more favourable attitudes toward ethnic minority groups) do not change their vote to support the ethnic minority candidate.

Aggregate Election Data

The ethnic minority status of Conservative candidates clearly affects their support in the experimental test, which establishes that it is the ethnic minority status itself that effects candidate support, and not some confounding variable such as support for the Conservative Party in urban areas, or the quality of candidates. However, while experiments are excellent at determining the causal mechanism, the artificial context could make generalization to real elections questionable. In particular, the size of the effects is probably different. To establish these effects in real elections, and to provide a greater level of confidence in the results, a second analysis is conducted using real election and candidate data.

The electoral data is provided by Elections Canada. Four elections are covered, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011. This time-period offers a unique advantage: redistricting changes electoral district boundaries with every 10-year census and so usually only two elections are conducted with the same districts, but during this time period a series of minority governments allows comparison across four elections with the same districts. The candidate data was gathered from candidate websites and media reports (details in appendix). This data is coded using the Statistics Canada definition of Visible Minorities: all non-White or non-European candidates, except Indigenous candidates. This research does not include Indigenous candidates, both because their

social position is quite different from ethnic minority immigrants, and to provide a better comparison to the experimental evidence above. Data on candidates of the four major parties was collected: the Conservatives, Liberals, New Democratic Party, and Bloc Quebecois. Unlike in the experiment, data from Quebec is included. Note that while it is sometimes claimed that discrimination against ethnic minorities is higher in Quebec, it does not seem like the Quebec districts are driving the effects here (see appendix).The "difference" variables cannot be computed for the first election, and for a small number of cases in which parties did not run candidates. This produces a total n of 2986.

The following analysis links electoral district level election results to data on candidate ethnicity and uses a difference-in-difference method. This method is common in economics, and has been used by a number of political science studies using aggregate election data (e.g. Morgan-Collins 2015, Street 2014). The difference-in-difference method compares results for the same electoral district and party across elections, and then compares the change in support in party/district units where the "treatment" differs. In this case, where the minority status of the candidate changed (or not). For example, for the electoral district Richmond Hill, in 2006 the Conservative party received 32% of the vote and in 2008 they received 36% of the vote – an increase of 4%. In the nearby district of Thornhill, the Conservatives received 34% in 2006, and 39% in 2008, for an increase of 5%. Then, the average change in ridings where the candidate's ethnicity changed is compared to those that it did not. In this case, Conservatives in Thornhill nominated White candidates in both 2006 and 2008, but in Richmond Hill they nominated a White candidate in 2006, and a minority candidate in 2008 (Chungsen Leung). Note that the Conservatives increased their support in both districts, but in Richmond Hill where they switched to a minority candidate the increase was smaller. Since the first stage compares the same ridings

to themselves over time this avoids the need for controlling for many time-invariant factors, such as the average education level or percentage of immigrants. While the characteristics of geographic areas do change over time, such as the average income of a district, there is probably little changeover the short time-periods considered here. On the other hand, controls are needed for things that vary over time, such as candidates nominated by other parties, or the margin of victory.

The difference-in-difference method has some major advantages compared to cross-sectional designs which compare aggregate results between different electoral districts in the same election (e.g. Black and Erickson 2006) or different individuals in different districts (e.g. Highton 2004). Most importantly, it avoids the need for a long list of statistical controls, and greatly reduces the risk of omitted variable bias. A second advantage is that real election data avoids problems with social desirability bias, which is a major issue in both experimental and cross-sectional research on discrimination. Rather than ask voters what they think of candidates, this data allows us to analyze their actual behaviour in a real election.

The "treatment" here is a change in candidate ethnic minority status, and so the analysis compares the change in vote totals between two elections for a party in electoral districts where the ethnicity of the candidate changed, to those where it did not. There are two ways to measure votes – as a proportion of eligible voters (change in votes), and as a proportion of total ballots (change in vote share). The former has the advantage of being unaffected by changes in other parties' turnout, while the latter is the key in determining the winner, so models are estimated for both. Unfortunately, it is not possible to model the change in elected status directly, simply because there are too few cases where both the ethnic minority status of the candidate and the elected status changes for the same party in the same electoral district. Note that this is a

consequence of using a difference-in-difference method, rather than a cross-sectional analysis – it is a data problem, not evidence against the hypothesis. The two key independent variables are the change in candidate ethnic minority status, and party. Candidate ethnic minority status has three values: minority-to-majority (127 cases), no change (2717 cases), or majority-to-minority (149 cases). Since it is possible that these have different effects, they are included as a set of dummy variables, with no changes as the references category. Dummy variables for party (Conservative/Other) as well as interactions between the candidate and party variables are included. While the difference-in-difference design automatically controls for all time-invariant variables, additional models include some other control variables. The margin of victory is included, since discrimination might be lower in close races because party supporters might prefer victory over their dislike of ethnic minority candidate. Candidate incumbency is also included, since they might receive more votes, and naturally do not change ethnic minority status. Finally, if other parties also nominate ethnic minority candidates, this reduces the ability of discriminatory voters to defect to a majority candidate, and so there is a variable for other ethnic minority candidates in the district. The basic form of the difference-in-difference equation is:

$$V_{pdt} = \alpha + \mathrm{M}_{pd} + d_t + M_{pd} * d_t + \varepsilon$$

Where *V* is the votes received by a party/distract unit in a certain time period, *M* is the candidate's minority status, and *d* is the time period. Subtracting one period from the next, the first-difference equation is:

$$\Delta V_{t2-t1} = \alpha + \Delta M_{\mathrm{t2-t1}} + \varepsilon$$

Since different results are expected for right-wing parties, a variable for party P (Conservative/other) is included, which does not vary by time, as well as an interaction term (candidates which switch parties are excluded). A set of control variables C (margin, other minority candidates, candidate incumbency), are also included.

$$\Delta V_{t2-t1} = \alpha + \Delta M_{\mathrm{t2-t1}} + P + (\Delta M_{\mathrm{t2-t1}} * P) + \Delta C_{t2-t1} + \varepsilon$$

Four models are estimated with OLS regression, using the change in votes (Model 2 and 3) and vote share (Model 4 and 5), both with and without controls, respectively. The predicted values in Figure 2 are second differences: the difference between the no-change and change in candidate minority status. As the bottom set of estimates shows, the predicted values for switching from a Conservative White candidate to an ethnic minority candidate are negative and statistically significant for both change in votes and vote share[4]. Looking at the models with controls, ethnic minority Conservative candidates receive about 4.5 percentage points fewer votes than the previous White candidate (p=.005). The share of votes an ethnic minority candidate receives compared to a previous majority candidate also declines, by about 7 percentage points (p=.01).

Contrary to expectations, the reverse - switching from a Conservative ethnic minority candidate to a White candidate - does not seem to increase support. The reasons for this is are not obvious and require further research, but perhaps once supporters have deserted for another candidate they tend to continue to support that candidate. Or, perhaps non-voting is habit

[4] In one sense statistical significance tests are not required – these are not sample data, they are population data for both candidates and votes. We might regard these as a kind of sample of all elections, or of all recent elections in Canada, but certainly they are not a random sample. Nonetheless, these statistics are often reported for conventional reasons, so they are included here.

forming (Coppock and Green 2015), so those who stay home in one election are more likely to not vote in the next, even if the original reason for staying home is gone. This would explain why the initial desertion due to an ethnic minority candidate does not fully rebound even when the ethnic minority candidate is later replaced by a White candidate. For the other parties, all effects in all models are not statistically significant.



Note: Predicted values are second differences, showing effect of a change in minority status (compared to no change) on increase/decrease in support from one election to the next. Results of Models 2-5. n=2986.

Finally, one possible problem with difference-in-different models is a violation of the common trend assumption. In this case, perhaps parties switched to ethnic minority candidates in ridings which they were already going to do worse in. To test this, a placebo regression is performed, which uses the prior election change in votes – for example, whether a vote change in

2004-2006 is correlated with a change in candidate ethnic minority status in 2006-2008. However, placebo estimates for the key coefficients are not statistically significant or signed in the wrong direction (Models 6 and 7, see appendix), which suggests that the common trends assumption is not violated, and the difference-in-difference inferences are valid.

Mechanisms

Using the experimental data can also provide a partial test of the two mechanisms outlined above. Right-wing voters might discriminate against minority candidates for two reasons. First, they simply have negative attitudes toward minorities, and therefore straightforwardly dislike minority candidates or hold negative stereotypes about them. Alternatively, they might stereotype minority candidates as being left-leaning, and not support them because they dislike the policy positions they would presumably pursue.

To test the negative attitudes explanation, a scale measure of attitudes towards minorities is used, composed of questions about "Canada should have more immigrants than we have now", "Muslims are a valuable part of Canadian society", and if "minorities are getting too demanding in their push for rights" (Cronbach's alpha = .66). Model 6 is similar to Model 1, but with an interaction with the attitudes toward minorities scale, rather than Conservative vote choice (unfortunately, the sample is not large enough for a four-way interaction). Figure 3 suggests that respondents with negative attitudes toward minorities are more likely to discriminate, but only when the minority candidate is Conservative. While the slope of the line for Liberal candidate is slightly negative, it is not statistically significant at any point.



Figure 3: Effect of Negative Attitudes Toward Minorities on Support for Minority Candidate

Note: Difference in support between white and minority versions of the candidate. Liberal candidate CI not shown, not statistically significant. All respondents. n=298

The ideological stereotyping explanation is tested using a question asking respondents to place the candidates on a 10-point left-right scale[5]. This is asked after respondents are asked to vote for one of the candidates, so we might expect consistency bias. Nonetheless, a perceived difference in the ideological position of White and minority candidates is at least a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of the ideological explanation. Model 7 has ideological placement of the candidate as the dependant variable (scaled 0-1, higher is further right), with respondent party preference (Conservative/other) and candidate ethnicity (White/minority), and a set of interactions. The results in Figure 4 do not support the ideological stereotyping explanation: there is little difference in the perceived ideological position of White and minority candidates (.01, p=.85)

[5]Respondents do rate Conservative candidates as more right-wing than Liberal candidates, so the measure seems to function correctly (not shown).



Figure 4: Ideological Stereotyping of Minority Candidates

Note: Perceived ideological position of candidates. Higher is further right. Predicted values for Conservative candidate and Conservative voters shown. Quantity of interest is difference between bars (.01, p=.85). n=298

Discussion and Conclusions

The experimental evidence shows that the ethnic minority candidates of the right-wing Conservative party received fewer votes than an otherwise identical majority candidate, demonstrating electoral discrimination. Conversely, the left-wing Liberal candidate suffered no such penalty, with no evidence that ethnic minority status affects their electoral support among White voters. Ironically, electoral discrimination seems to be is almost entirely "friendly fire": ethnic minority candidates of right-wing parties who suffer discrimination primarily from supporters of their own party.

To establish these effects in real elections, a difference-in-difference analysis using candidate data and aggregate election results over four elections was performed, and showed similar effects: a switch from a White Conservative candidate to an ethnic minority Conservative candidate lead to a decline in both supporter turnout and share of the vote. Importantly, while

ethnic minority Conservative candidates are discriminated against, other parties show no comparable effects. These effects are modest in size, but more than enough to change election results. For example, 51 seats were decided with a margin of less than 5 percentage points in the 2011 Federal Election (analysis by author), and ethnic minority candidates are concentrated in hotly contested electoral districts (Marwah et al. 2013). In addition, change of vote share can be magnified if the shift is primarily from one party to another: a change among 5 percent of voters could actually produce a 10 percent swing, as one party gains and another loses. These are also average effects, and in some districts the levels of discrimination seem to be much higher. For example, in eight districts where minority candidates replaced White Conservative candidates, their vote share declined by more than 25. Of course, this reflects many particular circumstances, including the unseating of a sitting (White) MP, who then ran and won as an independent (KTW 2005). Nonetheless, the point is in many cases the size of these effects might be quite large, and certainly enough to change election results.

Interestingly, the effect sizes of the change in votes models are larger than in the vote share models, which might reflect the effect of lower turnout. The Votes variable is relative to total eligible voters, rather than relative to the ballots cast, so it is more sensitive to changes in turnout then the Vote Share variable. Importantly, from a psychological perspective staying home might be a lower bar than switching parties. This is a possible link to Zingher and Farrer's (2014) finding of discrimination against ethnic minority candidates in the UK but not in Australia. In this work they suggest the difference could be a product of Australia's compulsory voting rules, which prevent voters from staying home as a form of discrimination (Zingher and Farrer's 2014). The implication is that systems without compulsory voting, like Canada and the United Kingdom, are likely to have greater discriminatory effects.

Most candidates here are of East Asian or South Asian or ancestry – those were the experimental treatments, as well as the large majority of candidates in the election data used here (Author). This is important because higher levels of discrimination might be likely against other groups, such as Black, Muslim or Indigenous candidates. Certainly public opinion polling (Soroka and Roberton 2010) and hate crimes statistics (Statistics Canada 2017) would suggest this, and these higher levels of discrimination might have a much larger effect on their likelihood of being elected.

Two mechanisms for why ethnic minority candidates suffer discrimination in elections and found that were tested, and there was support for negative attitudes toward minorities but not for ideological stereotyping. Respondents with more positive attitudes toward minorities were more likely to discriminate against the conservative candidate, but not the liberal candidates. While an interaction with respondent party preference was not possible, these result are consistent with the other findings. Conversely, minority candidates are not ideological stereotyped: minority candidates are not seen as further to the left than White candidates.

At first, this null finding about ideological stereotyping seems to contradict Street's (2014) finding that voters were more likely to think minorities would be candidates of left-wing parties. But the null finding here is about ideology, not party. This suggests an important nuance: this might be party stereotyping but not ideological stereotyping. Certainly this fits with the widespread evidence that attitudes toward social groups are generally much more influential than ideology.(e.g. Achen and Bartels 2016; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004; Converse 1964). Read in this way, voters who dislike minorities probably view them as out-group members in many ways: their ethnicity, nationality, and also their partisanship. Even when the minority candidates literally run under the party banner, these voters might think they are not "real"

Conservatives. If this reduces the loyalty of partisans, its effects could be quite large. The degree to which negative attitudes toward minorities leads to discrimination directly, or indirectly through the party mechanism, deserves further investigation.

Previous research has shown that the concentration of negative attitudes toward minorities leads to little or no discrimination, since voters with negative attitudes toward minorities are concentrated on the right, and minority candidates on the left (Street 2014). Here, I demonstrate that when minority candidates *do* run for parties on the right, they do suffer from discrimination, while those minority candidates on the left are insulated from it. Of course, there are many other factors which might be important, not least of which is the electoral system, which influences both the influence of candidate attributes, and how (or if) ethnic minority candidates are likely to be nominated. Nonetheless, this theoretical framework should be applicable to a wide range of countries, and would benefit from future cross-national tests.

Some might interpret the fact that this electoral discrimination is concentrated on ethnic minority right-wing candidates in a positive light, however reluctantly. After all, the polarization of party supporters does protect ethnic minority candidates on the left, to their benefit. Unfair though this might be, depending on the relative levels of discrimination and distribution of candidates, the result might actually be to elect more ethnic minority candidates than if ethnic minority candidates were equally disadvantaged in all parties.

However, the long term implications could be very negative. If ethnic minority candidates are unlikely to be elected as candidates of right-wing parties, this may produce a self-reinforcing spiral. Cairns (1968) made this argument decades ago about parties and regionalism, and the same should hold for ethnic minority issues and voters. As ethnic minority candidates abandon right-wing parties, so too will ethnic minority voters, members and activists. This will

reduce the pressure for policies important to these groups, which turns the screw yet again. The candidacy of Donald Trump is one example of how dangerous this phenomenon could be: with no hope of appealing to minority voters, the party might double down on even more extreme policies. Of course, the result need not be so serious. Parties can take a longer view and appeal to groups outside of their current supporters, especially if party leaders are willing and able to do so. This seems to be what the Conservative Party in Canada has done in the past, in part due to electoral geography which requires appealing to minority voters (Marwah et al. 2013), and the ability of strong party leaders to enforce pro-minority positions on their party (Author). Similarly, moderate (White) voters may view a party's nomination of ethnic minority candidate as desirable, which Sobolewska (2013) argues informs party strategy in Britain. However, as the Conservative Party's turn toward anti-minority rhetoric about the niqab and 'barbaric cultural practices' in the 2015 Canadian election showed, there is no guarantee this will continue. In any case, in the short run we should recognize that it is ethnic minority candidates of right-wing parties that suffer the brunt of electoral discrimination, and in the long run hope that right-wing parties do not succumb to a self-reinforcing spiral.

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Appendix

VARIABLES	Model 1 Vote	Model 8 Neg Attitudes	Model 9 Ideology
Conservative Candidate	-2.69***	-4.12**	0.18***
	(0.67)	(1.78)	(0.05)
Ethnic minority Candidate	-0.53	0.68	0.06
	(0.46)	(1.09)	(0.04)
Conservative*Ethnic minority Candidate	0.85	0.63	-0.11*
	(0.77)	(2.01)	(0.06)
Conservative Voter	-2.07***	-0.82	-0.05
	(0.70)	(1.94)	(0.06)
Conservative Voter*Candidate	5.37***	5.76**	0.01
	(1.04)	(2.89)	(0.08)
Conservative Voter*Ethnic Minority Candidate	0.90	-0.19	0.03
	(0.85)	(2.61)	(0.08)
Con Voter*Ethnic minority Candidate*Cons Candidate	-2.73**	-3.39	0.03
	(1.25)	(3.69)	(0.10)
Negative Attitudes Toward Minorities		0.06	
		(1.78)	
Conservative Candidate*Neg Att.		2.89	
		(3.18)	
Ethnic minority Candidate*Neg Att.		-2.32	
		(2.04)	
Conservative*Ethnic minority Candidate*Neg Att.		0.24	
		(3.52)	
Conservative Voter*Neg Att.		-1.93	
		(3.12)	
Conservative Voter*Candidate*Neg Att.		-1.31	
		(4.70)	
Conservative Voter*Ethnic Minority Candidate*Neg Att.		1.99	
		(4.21)	
Con Voter*Ethnic minority Candidate*Cons Candidate*Neg Att.		1.35	
		(5.95)	
Constant	0.89**	0.87	0.47***
	(0.40)	(0.92)	(0.04)
Observations	296	296	296
R-squared			0.10

Note: Experiment Models. Logistic Regression, OLS Regression for Ideology Model.
Coefficients reported, with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	Model 2 Votes	Model 3 Votes with Controls	Model 4 Vote Share	Model 5 Vote Share with Controls	Model 6 Placebo Vote Share	Model 7 Placebo Votes
Minority to Majority	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Majority to Minority	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conservative	0.07***	0.07***	0.12***	0.12***	0.04***	0.06***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Minority to Majority*Conservative	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Majority to Minority*Conservative	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Incumbent Candidate		0.01		0.01*	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Other Minority Candidates		0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Margin of Victory		-0.00		-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
		(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
2006/2008		-0.03***		-0.05***		
		(0.00)		(0.01)		
2008/2011		0.00		0.00	-0.03***	-0.06***
		(0.00)		(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.03***	-0.01**	0.00***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	2,993	2,986	2,993	2,986	1,987	1,987
R-squared	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.15	0.23	0.23

Note: Difference-in-difference models. All variables except Conservative are change between elections.
OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure 5. Difference in Difference, Without Quebec Districts.
Note: Predicted values are effect of minority candidate treatment on support. Results of Models 1a. n=298.

Specific Ethnicities

VARIABLES	Specific Candidate Ethnicity Model 1a
Conservative Candidate	-2.69***
	(0.67)
Conservative Voter	-2.07***
	(0.70)
Conservative Candidate*Voter	5.37***
	(1.04)
Chinese Candidate	-0.73
	(0.52)
South Asian Candidate	-0.32
	(0.53)
Conservative*Chinese Candidate	0.91
	(0.85)
Conservative*South Asian Candidate	0.80
	(0.87)
Conservative Voter*Chinese Candidate	1.91**

	(0.96)
Conservative Voter*South Asian Candidate	-0.29
	(1.09)
Conservative Voter*Conservative Candidate *Chinese Candidate	-3.82***
	(1.46)
Conservative Voter*Conservative Candidate *South Asian Candidate	-1.56
	(1.49)
Constant	0.89**
	(0.40)
Observations	296

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Figure 5. Difference in Difference, Without Quebec Districts.
Note: Compare to Figure 2. Predicted values are second differences, showing effect of a change in minority status (compared to no change) on increase/decrease in support from one election to the next. Results of Models 2a-5a. n=2095.

VARIABLES	Votes Model 2a	Votes with Controls Model 3a	Vote Share Model 4a	Vote Share with Controls Model 5a
Minority to Majority	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Majority to Minority	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Conservative	0.09***	0.09***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Minority to Majority*Conservative	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Majority to Minority*Conservative	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Incumbent Candidate		0.01		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Other Minority Candidates		0.00		0.01
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Margin of Victory		-0.00		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.03)
2006/2008		-0.04***		-0.07***
		(0.00)		(0.01)
2008/2011		0.00		0.00
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Constant	-0.02***	-0.01***	-0.04***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Observations	2,095	2,094	2,095	2,094
R-squared	0.18	0.22	0.17	0.21

Difference-in-difference models excluding Quebec districts. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Experiment Biographies, manipulated sections bolded.

Candidate 1

John Hawkes is an entrepreneur, and after being laid off twice he started the successful company, Allsort Inc. Despite a busy schedule Mr. Hawkes works with a number of organizations, including Kids Help Phone, and served as Vice Chair of the Municipal Safety Committee. John Hawkes is the **Conservative/Liberal** candidate.

Candidate 2

Arthur Dorre/Jun Zhang/Satveer Chaudhary is an active local businessman, who was recently honoured as "Businessman of the Year" for his many contributions. Mr. **Dorre/Zhang/Chaudhary** helps at the local community centre, and is the fundraising chair for the Hospital Foundation. A former provincial candidate, he lost in the most recent election. **Arthur Dorre/Jun Zhang/Satveer Chaudhary** is the **Conservative/Liberal** candidate.

Which candidate would you vote for?

Candidate Coding

The candidates were coded using the same method as a number of other studies, such as Black (2006, 2013) and Tossutti and Najem (2002). Note that unlike Black's analysis, this data includes Latin American origin candidates. The coding involves drawing on publicly available data, such as candidate biographies, newspaper articles, websites, and, where necessary, surname

analysis. For the most part, these sources are quite accurate – multicultural media such as the South Asian Times, for example, often publish lists of South Asian candidates. In addition, the CBC and Globe and Mail published riding profiles with candidate photos and biographies. While intercoder measures are not available for all of the data, Jerome Black generously provided his candidate data for 2011, and the coding matched for all but 4 of 998 candidates (.4%).