

conservative but not Conservative? Immigrants, Political Values, and Vote Choice

“New Canadians are naturally conservative in the way they live their lives: they are entrepreneurial; they have a remarkable work ethic; they are ... [an] aspirational class; they want stability; they are intolerant of crime and disorder; they have a profound devotion to family and tradition, including institutions of faith,”

- Minister of Immigration Jason Kenny, Conservative Party of Canada (Mak 2007)

Abstract: It is often claimed that immigrants have conservative values - yet immigrants generally support parties of the left. This study examines possible explanations for this apparent paradox. The political values of immigrants in five different ethnocultural groups are examined using multiple surveys, and the influence of these values on vote choice is tested. The findings indicate that immigrants do indeed have distinct political values, with some variation across groups and values. The conclusion argues parties of the right could appeal to the conservative values of immigrants - but the structure of partisan coalitions may not allow it.

It is sometimes claimed that immigrants are “natural conservatives”. They purportedly are socially and morally conservative, religious, have little tolerance for crime, and place value on hard work rather than government assistance. These arguments are often made in Canada as well as in the United States and in Europe. Yet there is also a great deal of evidence that immigrants tend to vote for parties of the left. If both claims are correct, this presents a puzzle – why would immigrants with conservative political values consistently support parties of the left?

This apparent contradiction is the focus of this paper, and three possible explanations are considered. First, immigrants may not actually hold conservative values. Second, perhaps the weight given to some issues and values varies depending on their social position – specifically, immigrants might well care more about immigration policy than non-immigrants, and this issue might then outweigh conservative opinions in other value domains. Third, if immigrants are conservative on some values but not others, parties of the right may simply not be emphasizing the correct issues.

To test these possibilities, the paper develops two sets of analyses using multiple datasets. The first section examines five political values for five different immigrant groups (European, East Asian, Latin American, South Asian, and Other non-European), since the place and culture of origin may have an important impact on values. The second part of the paper develops a set of vote choice models to examine the influence of these political values on vote choice for non-European immigrants.

The results suggest that immigrants do hold some conservative values, but there is variation by ethnocultural group and by specific political value. Specifically, the findings indicate that most of these political values are strongly related to vote choice – but there is no evidence that the influence of these values is any different for immigrants and non-immigrants. The conclusion argues that there are at least some grounds for expecting that right-wing parties could attract support from immigrants based on conservative values, but, at least in Canada, the structure of partisan coalitions may prevent this from being realized.

Naturally conservative?

The argument for immigrants having different values rests on the presumption that these immigrants' are socialized in other countries where different values are the norm. The World Values Survey, for example, was used to create a global “map” of values (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). While there are debates about the causes and meanings of this analysis, the key empirical points are that there are similarities in values among countries which are geographically and culturally close, and that that people from countries in different “regions” are more likely to have different values. The idea of value regions is intuitive – it should not be surprising that countries which share religions, histories, cultural influences, economic links, or media markets have similar values. Moreover, these cultural regions may be no less plausible than national borders, given the relatively arbitrary nature of many national borders due to colonial or geo-political factors.

In addition, the idea of differences in values is the premise of a large body of work on acculturation. Acculturation theory suggests that immigrants both accept new values and

abandon old ones over the time they reside in their country of immigration (Berry 1997). However, there is evidence that not all attitudes undergo acculturation at the same rate (White et al. 2008). Importantly, the literature on political values suggests values tend to be set relatively early, and are quite stable over the course of a lifetime (e.g. Sears and Funk 1999). Although there may well be some acculturation, it would not be surprising if immigrants retained distinctive values despite many years of residence in Canada. In sum, there is good reason to think that immigrants will have different values than other Canadians, and also that there may be differences between immigrants from different parts of the world. The analytical implication is that we should examine not only value differences between immigrants and non-immigrants, but also differences between immigrant groups.

In Canada, Conservative Minister Jason Kenney is responsible for much of the recent public discussion on the conservatism of immigrants, being the architect of the Conservative Party of Canada's concerted pursuit of immigrant voters over the last decade. That said, detailed academic studies on the political values of immigrants are limited. At least one study argues that the differences in social values – specifically gay marriage and women staying at home – are small and not statistically significant (Soroka et al 2011). Cochrane (2013), on the other hand, found that Muslim immigrants to Canada are less supportive of gay rights.

In the United States research often focuses on ethnic groups rather than immigrants specifically, but there is considerable evidence that Latino Americans are socially conservative, which includes being more religious and more likely to oppose abortion and gay marriage (Ellison 2005). Moreover, there is at least some evidence that this makes Latinos more likely to support the Republican Party (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). While there is less data on Asian-

Americans, Junn et al. (2011) found that a majority oppose abortion, particularly Filipino and Vietnamese Americans. Notably, immigrant Asian-Americans are far more distinctive in their attitudes on abortion than native born Asian Americans. On the other hand, Asian Americans are decidedly liberal on healthcare and immigration issues.

The claim that immigrants have conservative values also extends to European countries. Immigrants in Europe are also significantly more religious than other Europeans – especially so for those from countries with lower levels of modernization. (Van Tubergen 2006). In Belgium, Muslim have far more negative views of gay rights (Hooghe et al. 2010). Similarly, support for women's rights is lower among ethnic minority youth in Sweden and in Belgium (Germen 2008). In fact, the widespread belief that immigrants are opposed to gay rights and women's rights has resulted in the surprising adoption of gay rights and women's rights by European right-wing parties as part of an anti-immigrant agenda (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). Of course, anti-immigrant parties are not exactly credible sources of information on immigrants. Still, the fact that the same arguments about conservative immigrants are prominent in Europe suggests that this is a topic that deserves investigation. Taken together, this evidence suggests that we ought to take seriously the claim that immigrants hold conservative values.

Yet, despite these claims about conservative political values, most immigrants vote for parties of the left. In fact, some claim that immigrants tending to support parties of the left is a global pattern (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010). Ethnic minorities in the UK, many of whom are immigrants, are more likely to support the Labour Party than the Conservatives (Sanders et al 2013). Similarly, in the United States, Latino and Asian Americans are more likely to support the Democratic Party than the Republican Party (Pew Social Trends 2013). In Canada, Andre

Blais claimed that immigrants were one of the two “pillars of support” responsible for the Liberal Party’s decades long electoral dominance (2005). Similarly, Bilodeau and Kanji (2011) argued that immigrants are the most loyal partisan group, in terms of consistently supporting the Liberal Party of Canada. Evidence from the 2011 Canadian Election Study suggested that, although support for the Liberal Party has declined across the board in their worst electoral result in history, non-European immigrants continued to show a moderate preference for the Liberal Party (Soroka et al 2011). In sum, there is strong evidence from studies of electoral behaviour that immigrants, specifically non-European immigrants, tend to vote for parties of the left in Canada and elsewhere.

These conflicting literatures present an apparent puzzle: immigrants seem to have conservative political values, but vote for parties of the left. How are we to explain this? Here, three possibilities are considered. Most obviously, the claim that immigrants hold conservative values may be false. Given that that many of the claims of conservative immigrant values are often made by politicians or pundits, there is at least some grounds for skepticism. Further, while there are a number of academic studies which point to immigrants holding conservative values, many of these focus on single ethnic groups, or on single value domains, rather than a broad spectrum analysis. Therefore, it might well be that the purported conservative values of immigrants are exaggerated. An alternative explanation is that political values might play different roles in determining vote choice for immigrants than for other voters. This explanation implies that the social position of voters has an impact on the importance or relevance of values to the vote choice decision. Therefore, people who hold the same position on issues (and respond the same way in a survey) might come to different decisions, because they weight

values differently. The simplest example here is that a person who is an immigrant might care more about immigration policy than non-immigrants. Since positive attitudes toward immigration are generally associated with the left, people are more likely to vote for parties of the left if this issue is weighted more heavily than, for example, socially conservative attitudes. Finally, it might be that parties of the right have simply been unable (or unwilling) to emphasize the values which would attract immigrants. If immigrants are conservative in some value domains but not others, then their voting behavior may depend on which values are most relevant to the issues parties raise and campaign on. In that case, a key part of the story is not just the political values of immigrants, but the broader context of political coalitions and strategic issue emphasis.

Examine the Role of Political Values

The influence of values on vote choice has been a matter of much debate in recent years. While the famously pessimistic analysis by Converse argued that people do not have coherent ideological opinions because they do not have stable attitudes on specific issues (1964), the consensus in more recent research is that people do have broader values, which are defined as more general orientations, rather than opinion on specific issues. Of course, there is still disagreement on the precise dimensions of values (Schwartz et al. 1992, Tetlock 1986). Nonetheless, these more general values are connected to many important political factors, including policy attitudes (Feldman 1988) and parties (Miller and Shanks 1996), and vote choice (Caprara 2009). Therefore, questions about different issues should be regarded as representative of broader and more general values, rather than attitudes on specific issues.

Values, it should be noted, are also different than a simple left-right ideological position, though these are often correlated depending on the degree of political sophistication of the voter (Zaller 1992). Given that there is reason to think that immigrants are less politically sophisticated, both in terms of political interest and political knowledge (Howe 2007), this may be one reason for the weaker connection between values and vote choice. That is, immigrants may be less able than other voters to connect their values to ideological positions or parties. On the other hand, values are multidimensional, and individuals often hold some kinds of values that are associated with the left, and others with the right (Tetlock 1987). As a result, it is important to measure multiple kinds of values, rather than simple ideological placement.

Some recent research has questioned the direction of causality – for example, that partisanship shapes values, not the other way around (e.g. Goren et al 2009). This might occur in multiple ways, such as to reduce cognitive inconsistency or by following elite cues. After all, in trying to bring consistency between values and vote choice, it is easier to change responses on values questions in the present, than to change how one has voted in the past. No doubt there is some truth to this, especially among strong partisans. On the other hand, this research certainly does not claim that all values are caused by vote choice, nor that they have no effect on vote choice. Moreover, longitudinal studies have demonstrated robust causal effects of personality traits on vote choice, mediated by values (e.g. Caprara 2009). If we focus on the effect of partisanship or vote choice on values (rather than, for example, “hard” issues about which citizens know little), these kind of effects might upwardly bias the estimates of value effects on vote choice, but are unlikely to produce entirely new values, or reverse values.

which people already hold. Notably, these effects are also less likely in the case of immigrants, if only because they are less likely to be partisans (McAllister and Makkai 1991)

Examining the proposed explanations requires a two stage analysis – first evaluating the political values of immigrant groups, and then considering the influence of these values on vote choice. The first set of analyses explores whether or not immigrants hold more conservative political values as compared to other Canadians, or if this claim is simply not correct. The analysis draws on three sets of data: the pooled 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011 Canadian Election Studies, the Ethnicity, Security, Community Survey, and a web-panel survey to investigate the five political values. The second set of analysis tests the relationship between these political values and vote choice, and examines if these values have different effects for immigrants compared to non-immigrants.

We begin first with an analysis of the political values of immigrants. This is methodologically difficult, and the available data has placed severe limits on the analysis for three reasons. First, surveys tend to be either specialized, focusing on a specific set of values, or general, with scattered coverage. Moreover, these questions are often a legacy of long time series' – valuable in their own right, but not necessarily with carefully constructed wording. As a result, surveys with good questions on a wide array of political values are surprisingly rare. The second problem is simply of small numbers – most surveys do not have enough respondents to disaggregate into specific ethnocultural or national groups. The 2011 Canadian Election Study, for example, has 567 immigrants, 58 of which are South Asian. On the other hand, many government datasets, which are well funded and therefore very large, omit political questions because this is not considered a suitable use for taxpayer money (for example, the *Ethnicity*

Diversity Survey). Thus, most analysis is done using “immigrants” as a category even though there may well be important differences in political values between ethnocultural groups (for example White et al. 2008). Finally, if immigrants are disaggregated into more specific groups, this produces a great number of coefficients and predicted values – and at least some may be statistically significant by chance. To address these problems multiple datasets are used in order to test if similar results are obtained from multiple surveys. While the method of data collection and the overall sample make-up are different for each of the surveys, there is overlap in the questions used. If there are similar findings from multiple samples, our confidence in the results is greatly increased.

A very large amount of data is leveraged in this study, including seven different surveys: four Canadian Election Studies, the Equality, Community, Security survey, and a web-panel survey. The Canadian Election Studies are well known and while the number of immigrants in each survey is limited, the same questions are used in each survey. Therefore four surveys are pooled—2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011. The Equality, Community, Security survey was a major cooperative study with an oversample of urban areas. The web-panel used here is an internet-based survey conducted by the author, drawn from a national opt-in pool of respondents. Importantly, it has a large oversample of non-European origin respondents. Although there has been methodological debate about on-line panels (Linchiat and Krosnick 2009, though see Stephenson and Crête 2010), as will become clear later the results of web-panel sample are quite consistent with the more traditional samples. In total, the analysis uses 24,734 respondents, including 5,263 immigrants – 1,892 from the CES, 2,172 from the ESC, and 1,199 from the web-panel.

Five political values questions are analysed, representing key value domains. Question 1, “society would be better off if more women stayed at home” is a used as a measure of social conservatism. Question 2, is “how often, if at all, do you attend religious services” in the ESC and Web-panel, while the CES asks about the “importance of religion in your life” – slightly different questions, but the two are likely highly correlated. Question 3, “job creation should be left entirely to the private sector”, is a measure of economic conservatism. Question 4 asks about admitting immigrants – which is linked to more general attitudes toward ethnic diversity. Question 5 taps attitudes about crime, asking if “punishment for criminals is sometimes too severe, we should focus on rehabilitation instead”. Unfortunately, this question was only asked in the web-panel, and not in either of the other surveys. This question is used because there are no CES questions on crime that are both useful and consistent, and the ESC has no questions on crime at all. This is reflective of the surprisingly limited data on attitudes about crime and politics in Canada. All questions are coded so that 0 is the notionally liberal response and 1 is the notionally conservative response. Thus, positive correlations imply conservative values. Responses are on likert scales, with the exception of the ESC question on women staying at home, which only offers an agree/disagree option. Where the response is “do not know”, this is coded as the middle category. Where the respondent refused to answer the question, the response is dropped. Overall, these questions provide reasonable coverage of key political attitudes, and are quite likely to be related to vote choice.

As noted earlier, there is reason to think that immigrants from different parts of the world will have different values. Therefore, respondents are disaggregated into smaller ethnocultural groups as theory and data allows. The CES and ESC ask an open ended question

about the “ethnic or cultural group you belong to”, and most responses reference a country. Where different responses are given, there is usually a clear region implied (e.g. Tamil, Sikh). The web-panel asks about membership in Statistics Canada’s ethnocultural categories, of which some are countries (e.g. Chinese, Korean) and others are regions or ethnocultural groups (e.g. South Asian, Arab). This incongruence is unfortunate, but it does enable coding of three regions of origin used in the World Values Survey analysis discussed earlier - East Asia, South Asia, Latin America. The web-panel does not information on specific country of origin, so “not a visible minority” category are coded as European. Finally, Other non-European includes regions with too few respondents to form their own categories (Middle East, West-Asian, African, and Caribbean origins). These five categories are imperfect, but they represent a reasonable compromise between theory and available data, and are a considerable improvement over simply using immigrants as the category of analysis.

Political Values of Immigrants

The first set of models examines the political values of the various immigrant groups. The dependant variables are the political value questions. The key independent variables are ethnicity as a set of binary dummy variables (European, East Asian, South Asian, Latin American, and Other non-European), immigrant status, and an interaction term. The reference category is non-immigrant European origin Canadians. Income, education, age, and gender are also included as control variables. The analysis is repeated for each of the political values, and for each of the three datasets (CES surveys are pooled). Then, predicted values are generated using the Margins command in Stata, with demographic variables set to their means.

The results for the first political value question, “would society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children” - are presented in Table 1. These are first differences – that is, the difference in the political values between non-immigrant European-origin respondents and all other groups. The results show that all non-European immigrant groups are more likely to agree that women should stay home to raise children in at least two surveys. For European immigrants, however, the difference in predicted values are smaller and significant only in the CES. This provides good evidence for social conservatism among non-European immigrant groups, but results for European immigrants are more equivocal.

[Table 1 about here]

For the second value, Table 1 indicates that all immigrant groups are more religious. This includes European immigrants, unlike with the previous question about women staying at home. However, the difference seems to be much smaller – the average across surveys is .04 for European immigrants, compared to .16 for non-European immigrants. Interestingly, East Asian immigrants do seem to be more religious, despite some research suggesting they are less likely to participate in organized religion (Lai et al. 2005). In any case, this data is also consistent with claims about immigrant conservative values.

The third political value is economic conservatism. Table 2 shows that East Asian immigrants are much more likely to agree that the government should leave job creation entirely to the private sector in both the web-panel, by 11 points ($p<.001$), and the CES, by 7 points ($p=.006$). Other immigrant groups show no statistically significant effects, although 7 of 8

have positive (that is, conservative) signs. Perhaps non-immigrant European Canadians are indeed more economically liberal than most immigrants. Certainly this would be at odds with some depictions of immigrants as dependant on the welfare state. However, the only statistically significant effect for economic conservatism among East Asian immigrants.

The fourth political value question, on admitting immigrants, perhaps not surprisingly shows that immigrant respondents are more positive towards immigration. All immigrant groups show negative, statistically significant differences in predicted values. Regardless of their attitudes on other issues, this evidence indicates that immigrants clearly have liberal attitudes on immigration, and perhaps by extension other diversity related issues as well.

[Table 2 about here]

Finally, the last value considered is attitudes toward crime. Unfortunately, there are no comparable questions in the CES or ESC, and so only the web-panel data is analyzed. The results are presented in Table 2. There is certainly no evidence that immigrants are “tough on crime”. South Asian immigrants seem to have liberal attitudes toward crime, while the others are not statistically significant and mixed between positive and negative. This is difficult to interpret, but certainly there is no support here for the idea that immigrants are especially intolerant of crime.

In sum, immigrants are not consistently conservative on all political values, but there is clear evidence that some groups are conservative in some areas. The political value question about women staying home, here interpreted as social conservatism or traditional family

values, shows that most non-European immigrant groups seem to be more conservative than other Canadians. European immigrants, on the other hand, are not. All immigrant groups are more religious than non-immigrants, though the effects are much larger for non-Europeans.

On the other hand, evidence that immigrants are fiscally conservative depends on the ethnocultural group in question. For the most part, there is only weak evidence of a relationship in favour of a link between fiscal conservatism and immigration status. East Asian immigrants, however, do seem to be fiscal conservatives, at least as far as the evidence presented here. The results on crime are less clear, but South Asian immigrants seem to oppose tough on crime policy. On immigration, as we might expect, all immigrant groups are pro-immigration. On this value, immigrants are decidedly more liberal than non-immigrants. This analysis suggests that there is at least some truth to the claim that non-European immigrants have conservative values – on the dimensions measure here, they are conservative on two (social conservatism and religion), mixed on two others (fiscal conservatives and crime) and liberal on one (immigration).

Political Values and Vote Choice

We now turn to the second part of the puzzle – if immigrants, and especially non-European immigrants, have at least some conservative values, why do they tend to vote for parties of the left? One explanation for this, as discussed earlier, is that political values may be weighted differently depending on the social position of the respondent. The obvious example here is that immigration policy might well be more influential in the vote choice of immigrants than for non-immigrant Canadians, either because they are immigrants themselves, or because of the

broader symbolic association with racial diversity. This section of the paper examines the influence that political values have on vote choice for non-European immigrants. The method is simple – I use a set of vote choice models that interact non-European immigrant status with political values. European immigrants did not appear to be very distinct in the previous analysis, and so they are excluded from the analysis – this also has the benefit of avoiding a three way interaction (political value/immigrant status/European-origin) in favour of an easily interpretable two-way interaction. If the interaction is significant, this will suggest that political values play a different role in vote choice for different groups.

The vote choice models use the web-panel dataset analyzed earlier, since it is the only dataset with all of the political values questions. Since there is likely to be collinearity between the different political values, logistic regression models are estimated separately for each political value question, and estimated both with and without demographic controls. In total, ten separate models are estimated. In each, the dependant variable is reported vote for the Conservative Party in the 2011 Federal Election. The independent variables are the political value, the immigrant/origin variable, an interaction term, and demographic controls. The demographic control demographic variables are age, income, education, gender. The five political values are those analyzed above – women staying at home, private sector creating jobs, immigration, religious attendance, and crime. The immigrant/origin variable is a four category set of dummy variables - European non-immigrants, European immigrants, non-European non-Immigrants, and non-European immigrants. The variable is constructed in this way, rather than a three way interaction between immigrant status, origin, and political value, because three way interactions are much more difficult to interpret (and require more tables to

present). Finally, the immigrant variable is interacted with the political values to produce the key coefficients of interest. Table 3 presents the coefficients of the political values, and of the interaction terms. The focus here is on non-European immigrants, both because the preceding analysis showed they were more distinctive, and because this is the population of interest for most of the debates cited above. The results for European immigrants and for other specifications, such as the full set of groups used above, produce essentially the same results (analysis not shown).

The findings, presented in Table 3, are very clear: while the main coefficients of the political values are generally large and significant, the interactions are not. That is, conservative political values are correlated with voting Conservative, but these values do not have different effects for different groups. To be clear, this does *not* mean that attitudes about immigration, for example, are not important for the vote choice of immigrants. Rather, there is no evidence showing that they are more (or less) influential than for other Canadians. One of the explanations proposed above, is that immigrants vote for parties of the left because they weight issues favouring the left, such as immigration, higher than those favouring the right, such as religion or social conservatism. However, the analysis here shows no evidence of immigrants weighting issues differently than other Canadians.

[Table 3 about here]

Discussion and Conclusions

The first question posed in this paper was whether immigrants have more conservative values than other Canadians. The answer appears to be, partially, yes – for some ethnocultural groups and on some issues. The values considered here include five domains – fiscal conservatism, social conservatism, religious traditionalism, immigration, and crime. These are by no means exhaustive, but they provide a good representation of key political values. The results indicate that rather than immigrants being uniformly more conservative, they are conservative on some value domains, and there are differences based on place of origin. Non-European immigrants are more socially conservative, being more likely to say that women should stay home. All immigrant group are more religious, but again European immigrants are less distinct - the differences in predicted values for European-immigrants are much smaller than for non-European immigrants.

While there is some suggestion that immigrants are more fiscally conservative – 9 of 10 difference in predicted values are positive – they are only statistically significant for East Asian immigrants. Similarly, there is no evidence that immigrants are “tough on crime”, and in fact South Asians have a negative difference in predicted values – i.e. they are “softer” on crime than non-immigrant non-Europeans Canadians. Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly, all immigrant groups are decidedly more liberal on immigration.

Given the great number of predicted values generated, there is considerable risk that some will be statistically significant just by chance. However, by drawing on multiple surveys, we can gain considerable leverage on this issue. For women staying at home variable, all non-European immigrant groups show statistically significant differences in predicted values in at

least two of the surveys. Most of the null results are in Canadian Election Study data – perhaps because of difference in recruitment, or simply because the number of respondents is smaller. For religiosity and immigration, the differences in predicted values are also consistent across all surveys, except for Latin Americans' religiosity. Given that the CES differences in predicted values is significant, that there is no theoretical reason that Latin Americans should be less religious than other immigrants, and this would be inconstant with American research (e.g. Pew 2007), and perhaps the lack of significance in other surveys is simply by chance.

One intriguing finding is that East Asian immigrants might have distinct political values. East Asians immigrants were more fiscally conservative in the Web-panel, in both the Web-pane and CES data, but none of the other immigrant groups were. As noted later, this would be consistent with anecdotal evidence, but more research would certainly be useful. This might be because of there is substantial number of relatively well-off Chinese immigrants in Canada arrived during the 1990s as from Hong Kong, and more recently from mainland Chinese as “investor” class of immigrants. It would not be surprising if differences in class and income were related to values like economic conservatism, the role of the private sector, and government spending. Future research should aim at confirming these findings, and investigating compositional, cultural and structural factors which might cause difference in political values. If nothing else, the difference in results between surveys highlights the value of using multiple datasets.

This analysis shows that immigrant groups are clearly distinct on some political values that are to the right, including on the role of women and religiosity, but to the left on immigration. On all of these values, however, European immigrants are considerably less

distinct (that is, more similar to non-immigrant European-Canadians) than non-European immigrants. Conversely, for some values there may be differences between ethnic groups – only East Asian immigrants are fiscally conservative, and only South Asians are different (more liberal) on crime.

The second set of analyses examined the possibility that political values are weighted differently – in particular, that attitudes toward immigration might be especially influential for immigrant voters. For immigrants, diversity issues might consistently outweigh social conservative issues, thus explaining a tendency to vote for parties of the left. The evidence, however, suggests this is not the case. While the coefficients for political values are significant, the interactions between political values and ethnicity were not. The implication is that the influence of political values is essentially the same for both immigrant and non-immigrant voters.

Given this, it seems most plausible that the influence of political values, for both immigrants and other Canadians, is determined by the broader political and informational context. In research on election and public opinion it is well established that priming, framing, agenda setting, and similar dynamics alter vote choice and opinion on specific issues, despite more general values remaining unchanged (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Zaller 1992). Which values are brought to bear in a specific instance depends, in large part, on the context. Importantly, parties can – and do – affect which issues are prominent in political campaigns by raising some issues and not others, and promoting or avoiding polarization relative to other parties (Johnson et al. 1992). Thus, the influence of different political values is a combination of the facts on the ground, and the strategic choices of parties. The implication is that there is

indeed potential to motivate the support of immigrants based on their political values, but whether this potential materializes depends, in good part, on the parties' actions.

Taking stock of the current Canadian political landscape, it is notable that the recent (relative) success of the Conservative Party in avoiding polarisation on political values which might otherwise give them an advantage in pursuing support from non-European immigrants. Specifically, non-European immigrants, in this research, appear to be both more religious and more socially conservative than other Canadians. Yet the Conservative Party of Canada has essentially abandoned these positions. While we might speculate on the true opinions of politicians, it is clear that the Conservative Party has striven to keep these issues off the national agenda, and avoids polarisation against other parties. On the other hand, the Canadian federal parties do remain polarized on economic and fiscal issues. Interestingly, this fits with claims that the Conservatives' efforts are quite successful with Chinese-Canadians, including that the Conservatives had the support of two thirds of Cantonese speakers (Friesen and Sher 2011), and lead the Liberals in fundraising from Chinese donors (McGregor 2014) - recall that in this analysis, it was only East Asian immigrants who were more fiscally conservative than other Canadians.

In the end, this may be a lesson in coalition politics. It is quite likely that the Conservative Party is constrained from taking advantage of the "natural" social and religious conservatism of immigrants by the general values of other Canadians. Strong socially conservative policies could attract some South Asian and Latin American immigrant voters, but these same policies could repel the suburban voters that are another crucial part of their winning coalition. If true, this is a fascinating mirror image to the constraint placed on the

Conservative Party's immigration and multiculturalism policy by the pursuit of immigrant voters. On the one hand the Conservative Party must resist the desire from other parts of their base to repeal multiculturalism and restrict immigration, in order to pursue support from non-European immigrants. On the other hand, they are restricted in their appeals to socially conservative immigrants by more moderate voters. Ultimately this means that even if some immigrants are naturally conservative, the Conservative Party may not be able to appeal to those values.

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Table 1: Social Conservatism and Religiosity

<i>Women Should Stay at Home</i>	Web-Panel	ESC	CES
European	.06	.04	.05***
East Asian	.11***	.05	.09**
South Asian	.09***	.28***	.13***
Latin American	.15***	.28*	-.004
Other Racialized	.05*	.17*	.017

<i>Religiosity</i>	Web-Panel	ESC	CES
European	.07*	.03+	.03**
East Asian	.05*	.07*	.17***
South Asian	.30***	.27***	.14***
Latin American	.11	.17*	.19***
Other Racialized	.25***	.11*	.20***

Note: Logistic regression for ESC women at home, others use OLS regression. Dependant variables are political values. Cell Entries are first differences between predicted values of non-immigrant European origin respondents and other groups. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, + p ≤ .1

Table 2: Economic Conservatism, Immigration, and Crime

<i>Private Sector Should Create Jobs</i>	Web-Panel	CES
European	.006	.02
East Asian	.11***	.07**
South Asian	.04	.03
Latin American	.02	.13
Other Racialized	-.001	.02
<i>Admit Fewer Immigrants</i>	Web-Panel	CES
European	-.04+	-.08***
East Asian	-.08***	-.14***
South Asian	-.11***	-.18***
Latin American	-.07*	-.24***
Other Racialized	-.10***	-.19***
<i>Tough on Crime</i>	Web-Panel	
European	-.017	
East Asian	-.003	
South Asian	-.09***	
Latin American	.06	
Other Racialized	.003	

Note: OLS regression with political values as the dependant variable. Cell Entries are first differences between predicted values of non-immigrant European origin respondents and other groups. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, + p ≤ .1

Table 3: Political Values and Voting Conservative

<i>Variable</i>	<i>No Controls</i>	<i>With Controls</i>
Women at Home	0.27	0.32
*Non-European Immigrants	1.30	-0.23
Private Sector Jobs	-0.15***	1.25***
*Non-European Immigrants	-0.45	-0.29
Less Immigrants	0.65*	0.866**
*Non-European Immigrants	-0.20	-0.382
Religiosity	1.02***	1.042***
*Non-European Immigrants	-0.25	-0.395
Tough on Crime	1.01***	0.78**
*Non-European Immigrants	-0.19	0.00

Note: Logistic Regression with reported Conservative vote

as the dependant variable. Cell Entries are first differences between predicted values of non-immigrant European origin respondents and other groups. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, + p ≤ .1